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Comment:
Professor Robert A. Burt
Yo/ University Low School
Commenting on David Chombe~s•s
"The Legalization of the Family :
Toward a Policy of Supportive
Neutra lit y"
Professor Burt's "Response"
centered on Professor Chambers's
discussion of the Marvin case as
manifesting conf li cting principles of
governmental conduct toward the
family . Burt questioned whether
Chambers had successfu ll y distinguished among the principles of
coercion, to which he was opposed ,
and of governmenta l facilitation of
individual cho ice, which he celebrated. in discussing the Marvin
case.
Summarizing Chambers's view of
the case, Burt concurred with the
concern that the decision leaves the
definition of "fair" treatment to the
discretion of the courts. Like
Chambers, Burt feared "that the
Ca lifornia Supreme Court's willingness to presume agreement almost
inevitably will lead judges to imp?se
their moral values on the unmarried
couples in these cases .". Bu~t a(so_accepted th at this impos1t1on 1s s1m1_lar
in principle to the kinds of C?erc~ve
impositi ons mandated by leg1slat1ve
measures such as the proposed
Senate Family Protection Act
and traditional state laws against
fornication.
What Burt did not accept was
Chambers's view that the Marvin
decision was coercive primarily
because of the interpretive latitude
it allowed the courts . To Burt, this
extension of judicial authority was
no different in principle from the
specific holding of the case, that
"after the unmarried couple has
separated, a court should enforce the
speci fie terms of agreements that t_he
parties had entered at som~ ea_rl_1er
time when th ey were happily h vrng
tog e th e r ."
While Chambers saw the Marvin
case as essentially an expression of
gove rnm e nt al relucta_nce t_o impose
its views of right relat1onsh1ps on the
citi zens. Burt argued that it would be
an instance of coercion . even had the
cou rt agreed to uphold only written
co ntract s between couples, as
Chambers suggested it should have.
Even in that form, the decision
would deprive people of the freedom to change their minds .
Lee Marvin might have seen such
a ruling as enab ling him to e nt er a

genuine trusting rela _tions~ip when
he was a nxious to bmd himself to
Michelle Triolla . In the actual event.
Marvin could not have seen the
California Supreme Court's opinion
as enhancing his freedom of choice.
While the state may not have imposed its conception of _morali_ty on
Marvin, it did require his contmued
adherence to a morality which he
ma y once have embraced but came
to regret.
By enforcing promises, the state
lends its coercive weight to one essentially moral position over another
about the nature of freedom, Burt
said. Even by creating the opti_on '.or
married couples to enter brnd~ng
promises, the state ma y be puttmg
pressure on individuals to do s_o . If
this is so, Burt asked. "then can 1t be
truly said that the state tha~ offe'.s
the option is simply enhancrng this
unmarried couple's freedom of
choice? Or is the state creating subtle but powerful incentives that lead
this couple toward the kind of longterm mutuall y trusting relationship
that the state finds desirable?"
Although Burt thus charact~riz~d
the Marvin decision as coercive m
principle , he also challenged
Chambers's v iew that the state
should not thus encourage certain
kinds of relationships . Burt's argument rested on the applicability of
the general principle of state protection for the weaker party in man y
transactions. "Couples do not always
enter their relationships as equals,"
h e said . " In the past , at least. women
ha ve been too easi ly victimized by
men in man y such relationships." It
ma y be necessary for the state to
coerce the strong to prevent their
abusing the weak. " This is, after all,''
Burt
aid, "t he fundamental
justification for state cl~ims to co'.°bat man different krnds of discrimination or abusive conduct in
our ociety."
Burt acknowledged that these
arguments bear similarities to
justifications offered by proponents
of crimina l fornication statutes and
other distasteful impositions .
Distinctions in degree are essential
for Burt, since he was not persuaded
that "there is a bright line of principl
between the Marvin case,
which represents 'freedom,' and
these oth er traditional state policies.
which represent 'mora l coercion ,' "
by Chambers's argume nt.
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